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This article considers the impact of Target 16.9 of the Sustainable Development Goals (‘SDGs’), 
‘to provide legal identity for all, including birth registration’ on the objective of eradicating 
statelessness. This SDG Target has given a significant boost to initiatives for the strengthening of 
civil registration and identification systems, supported by the United Nations and World Bank. Yet 
its impact on the resolution of statelessness is not clear, because of the immense complexity of the 
definition of ‘legal identity’. Proposed definitions, adopted after the target was established, fail to 
take on board the challenges involved in cross-border recognition of civil status documents and 
the determination of nationality of a child for parents who hold no documents. The article 
concludes that SDG Target 16.9 is both an opportunity and a threat. If the objective of providing 
universal ‘legal identity’ is to have a positive impact for stateless persons there is a need for new 
engagement with the regulation of civil status in private international law, and new insistence in 
public international law on legal frameworks that facilitate recognition and registration of the 
different elements of a person’s identity, including nationality, even and especially where they are 
officially in doubt. Short cuts in this process risk long delays. 
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 THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS AND LEGAL IDENTITY 
In September 2015, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Sustainable 
Development Goals (‘SDGs’), an ambitious set of objectives for international 
development to replace and expand upon the 15-year-old Millennium 
Development Goals adopted in 2000. Goal 16 is one of the broadest: ‘Promote 
peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to 
justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all 
levels’. Each Goal has a set of more detailed targets: Target 16.9 requires that 
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states should, by 2030, ‘provide legal identity for all, including birth registration’.1 
The indicator adopted to measure progress towards Target 16.9 was the percentage 
of children under five whose births have been registered, a statistic already widely 
available.2  
One year earlier, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(‘UNHCR’) had launched a ten-year campaign to end statelessness by 2024, the 
#IBelong campaign, including a ten-point global action plan, with universal birth 
registration as Action 7. While birth registration in itself does not confer 
nationality, and is usually not legally proof of nationality, the official record of the 
place and date of birth and identity of the parents of the child provides critical 
evidence of the facts that enable the child to assert the right to nationality in one 
or more states.3 In principle, SDG Target 16.9 should provide a significant boost 
to the achievement of UNHCR’s campaign, especially the ambition to end 
statelessness at birth.  
Yet it is notable that the SDG target endorsed by states was for a less specific 
and less demanding target — legal identity rather than nationality for all — and 
set a longer time frame than the UNHCR campaign. On the one hand, the meaning 
of ‘legal identity’ was not clear; on the other, a person may have a document that 
is official proof of identity and yet still be stateless. The SDG target also does not 
have any equivalent to Action 8 in the #IBelong campaign, calling on states to 
issue nationality documentation to those with entitlement to it.  
At past the halfway point in the UNHCR campaign, now is a good moment to 
evaluate the contribution of the SDG target to its realisation, and whether the drive 
for ‘legal identity’ is a threat or an opportunity for the stateless. From the outset, 
there were concerns that the legal identity target in the SDGs could be a distraction 
from the campaign to eradicate statelessness, or even prove to be damaging, if 
underlying laws were not reformed before new official identification initiatives 
were rolled out.4 There is also a long history of scholarship about the double nature 
of identification and registration systems: as tools to build state capacity and social 
welfare systems, and enable those registered to assert their rights, as the SDG 
 
1   ‘Sustainable Development Goal 16’, United Nations Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform (Web Page, 2015) 
<https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg16>. 
2   SDG indicators available at: Sustainable Development Goal Indicators Website (Web Page) 
<http://unstats.un.org/sdgs/>. Birth registration data is collected through UNICEF’s Multiple 
Indicator Cluster Surveys and the USAID-funded Demographic and Health Surveys. 
Coverage of children under one year old was also considered in Birth Registration for Every 
Child by 2030: Are We on Track? (Report, UNICEF December 2019) 
<https://data.unicef.org/resources/birth-registration-for-every-child-by-2030/>. 
3   Guidelines on Statelessness No 4: Ensuring Every Child’s Right to Acquire a Nationality 
through Articles 1–4 of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (Guidelines, 
UNHCR 21 December 2012); I Am Here, I Belong: The Urgent Need to End Childhood 
Statelessness (Report, UNHCR November 2015); Good Practices Paper Action 7: Ensuring 
Birth Registration for the Prevention of Statelessness (Good Practices Paper, UNHCR 
November 2017). See also the UNHCR and UNICEF-led coalition on every child’s right to a 
nationality: IBELONG: Coalition on Every Child’s Right to a Nationality (Web Page) 
<https://www.unhcr.org/ibelong/unicef-unhcr-coalition-child-right-nationality/>. 
4   Bronwen Manby, ‘“Legal Identity for All” and Childhood Statelessness’ in Laura van Waas 
and Amal de Chickera (eds), The World’s Stateless: Children (Report, Institute on 
Statelessness and Inclusion January 2017) 313 
<http://children.worldsstateless.org/3/childhood-statelessness-and-the-sustainable-
development-agenda/legal-identity-for-all-and-childhood-statelessness.html>. 




target intends; but also as instruments of exclusion, surveillance and control.5 
Moreover, the process of sorting individuals into different nationalities is, by its 
nature, discriminatory and not necessarily empowering.6 But even if we accept the 
assumption that recognition and registration of a person’s legal identity by the 
state is ‘the crucial primary instrument for realising entitlements’,7 and that 
recognition or acquisition of nationality is always a good, what has become most 
apparent in six years is the immense complexity of an assessment of the SDG 
commitment to ‘provide legal identity’ in relation to the resolution of 
statelessness. 
The following Parts set out the existing legal framework for ‘identity’ and birth 
registration in international law; followed by a discussion of the complexities of 
the recognition of civil registration documents across borders; the contribution of 
the UN system to the strengthening of civil registration systems; the interpretation 
of the ‘legal identity’ target by the development community; and finally the likely 
interaction between ‘legal identity’ and the effort to end statelessness. The article 
concludes that the combined efforts of private and public international law are 
needed to overcome the very substantial risk that short cuts will create long delays 
for stateless persons, and to ensure that the target has a positive impact on the 
prevention and reduction of statelessness. SDG Target 16.9 is both an opportunity 
and a threat for those who are most marginalised within current systems for official 
recognition of legal identity.  
 LEGAL IDENTITY AND BIRTH REGISTRATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW  
The difficulty of understanding the potential impact of SDG Target 16.9 starts 
from the fact that ‘legal identity’ is not a term that had any pre-existing definition 
in international law. The indicator adopted to measure progress, the percentage of 
children under five whose birth has been registered, leaves significant uncertainty 
on what it would take to know that the target had been reached;8 thus, ‘there is no 
simple answer to the measurement question’.9 This is most obviously true in 
relation to any person over five years old; but also for birth registration itself, both 
the technical criteria for measuring coverage, and the elements of identity that 
should be recorded within the birth register. 
 
5   Collected volumes of the past two decades review this history in comparative perspective: see 
Jane Caplan and John Torpey (eds), Documenting Individual Identity: The Development of 
State Practices in the Modern World (Princeton University Press 2001); Colin J Bennett and 
David Lyon (eds), Playing the Identity Card: Surveillance, Security and Identification in 
Global Perspective (Routledge 2008); Keith Breckenridge and Simon Szreter (eds), 
Registration and Recognition: Documenting the Person in World History (Oxford University 
Press 2012); Ilsen About, James Brown and Gayle Lonergan (eds), Identification and 
Registration Practices in Transnational Perspective: People, Papers and Practices (Palgrave 
Macmillan 2013).  
6   Dimitry Kochenov, Citizenship (MIT Press 2019); Dimitry Kochenov and Justin Lindeboom 
(eds), Kälin and Kochenov’s Quality of Nationality Index: An Objective Ranking of the 
Nationalities of the World (Hart Publishing 2020). 
7   Simon Szreter and Keith Breckenridge, ‘Editors’ Introduction: Recognition and Registration: 
The Infrastructure of Personhood in World History’ in Breckenridge and Szreter (n 5) 1, 12. 
8   Jaap van der Straaten, ‘Legal Identity for All by 2030: How Will We Know?’ (Position Paper, 
Civil Registration Centre for Development—CRC4D 2015) 
<https://www.crc4d.com/downloads/2015-10-legal-identity-for-all-by-2030-how-will-we-
know-position-paper.pdf>.  
9   Alan Gelb and Anna Diofasi Metz, Identification Revolution: Can Digital ID Be Harnessed 
for Development? (Center for Global Development 2018) 36. 
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A range of international human rights standards, starting from art 6 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (‘UDHR’),10 reinforced by art 16 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (‘ICCPR’),11 establish that 
every person has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law. 
Although there has been little clarification on detailed content of this formulation, 
it ‘expresses the right and the capacity of each human being to be the holder of 
rights and obligations under the law’,12 enabling a person to assert rights, to 
enforce contracts or to defend a case in court.13 This right is not dependent on 
existence in any register nor on holding official identification papers; it is already 
attributed by international law. Indeed, neither the drafters of the UDHR nor those 
of the 1959 Declaration of the Rights of the Child considered it necessary to 
include the right to birth registration as a free-standing right — though both 
proclaimed the right to a name and nationality.14  
It was only with the adoption of the ICCPR in 1966 that a right to birth 
registration was enshrined, based on concern about the rights of refugee and 
displaced children, and those born out of wedlock — and freed by this date from 
the colonial states’ hesitancy about the implications of universal birth registration 
for the rights of colonised populations.15 Article 24 of the ICCPR provides for 
every child to have the right to a name, to be registered immediately after birth 
and to acquire a nationality. The same commitments are reinforced (with 
variations in wording) by art 7 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(‘CRC’)16 — adopted in 1989 and by which every state in the world except for the 
United States has agreed to be bound — and art 29 of the 1990 International 
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members 
of Their Families.17  
Article 8 of the CRC also introduced the overarching concept of ‘identity’ to 
international law, establishing the child’s right ‘to preserve his or her identity, 
including nationality, name and family relations as recognized by law’.18 The 
product of advocacy efforts by the newly democratic Argentinian government in 
the wake of forced adoptions during the military dictatorship, and building on 
existing Latin American frameworks of recognition for child rights,19 art 8 places 
 
10   Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217A (III), UN GAOR, 3rd sess, 183rd plen 
mtg, UN Doc A/810 (10 December 1948). 
11   International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 
1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976). 
12   Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, General Comment on the Right 
to Recognition as a Person before the Law in the Context of Enforced Disappearances, UN 
Doc A/HRC/19/58/Rev.1 (2 March 2012). 
13   Sarah Joseph and Melissa Castan, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: 
Cases, Materials, and Commentary (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2013) 329–39. 
14   Declaration on the Rights of the Child, GA Res 1386 (XIV), UN GAOR, 14th sess, 841st plen 
mtg, Agenda Item 64, Supp No 16, UN Doc A/4354 (20 November 1959) principle 3.  
15   Dominique Marshall, ‘Birth Registration and the Promotion of Children’s Rights in the 
Interwar Years’ in Breckenridge and Szreter (n 5) 449, 464–70. 
16   Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature 20 November 1989, 1577 UNTS 
3 (entered into force 2 September 1990) (‘CRC’). 
17   International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of Their Families, opened for signature 18 December 1990, 2220 UNTS 3 (entered 
into force 1 July 2003). 
18   CRC (n 16) art 8. 
19   Rita Arditti, Searching for Life: The Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo and the Disappeared 
Children of Argentina (University of California Press 1999); Anne-Emmanuelle Birn, 
‘Uruguay’s Child Rights Approach to Health: What Role for Civil Registration?’ in 
Breckenridge and Szreter (n 5) 415. 




an obligation on states to re-establish identity if ‘a child is illegally deprived of 
some or all of the elements of his or her identity’.20 The CRC establishes the 
content of ‘identity’ through an open rather than closed list, allowing for other 
elements to be included beyond name, nationality, and family relations, as 
appropriate in the context.21 In essence, it creates the obligation for child 
protection systems to move beyond welfare and take seriously the importance of 
establishing the legal connections of a child to his or her family, broadly defined, 
in the eyes of the government. This includes the case of abandoned or separated 
children whose biological parents should be sought, and independent legal 
recognition established if this is not possible.  
The right to recognition as a person before the law is thus, in international law, 
not dependent on existence in any register nor on holding official identification 
papers. Similarly, the right to preserve an identity in the CRC is not formally 
dependent on birth registration: a child’s nationality should be recognised, for 
example, if the criteria are fulfilled, even in the absence of an existing birth 
certificate or other document confirming that fact. Family relations should be 
recognised by the state even if never previously officially recorded. The 
documents are declaratory, not constitutive.  
However, it has for a long time also been clear that without official recognition 
that a person exists, and has rights set out in national law, the human rights 
protections established in international law may be worth little: ‘nonsense on 
stilts’, as famously denigrated by Jeremy Bentham.22 The importance of birth 
registration as an essential safeguard for other rights is now everywhere 
emphasised by the UN system.23 Universal birth registration is a central objective 
of UNICEF’s child protection work, aiming to overcome both weaknesses in state 
capacity and deliberate patterns of discrimination.24 Treaty bodies have repeatedly 
highlighted the importance of both registration and the issue of a birth certificate: 
in combating trafficking of children, and providing proof of age for the purposes 
of criminal justice, immigration control, and marriage.25  
 
20   CRC (n 18) art 8. 
21   See generally Jaap E Doek, Article 8: The Right to Preservation of Identity; Article 9: The 
Right Not to Be Separated from His or Her Parents, ed André Alen et al (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers 2006). 
22   Jeremy Bentham, Rights, Representation, and Reform: Nonsense upon Stilts and Other 
Writings on the French Revolution, ed Philip Schofield, Catherine Pease-Watkin and Cyprian 
Blamires (Oxford University Press 2002). 
23   Human Rights Council, Birth Registration and the Right of Everyone to Recognition 
Everywhere as a Person before the Law: Report of the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Doc A/HRC/27/22 (17 June 2014); see also Human 
Rights Council, Birth Registration and the Right of Everyone to Recognition Everywhere as 
a Person Before the Law, UN Doc A/HRC/RES/19/9 (3 April 2012); Human Rights Council, 
Birth Registration and the Right of Everyone to Recognition Everywhere as a Person before 
the Law, UN Doc A/HRC/RES/22/7 (9 April 2013). 
24   Every Child’s Birth Right: Inequities and Trends in Birth Registration (Report, UNICEF 
2013); A Passport to Protection: A Guide to Birth Registration Programming (Handbook, 
UNICEF December 2013). 
25   Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No 21: Children in Street Situations, 
UN Doc CRC/C/GC/21 (21 June 2017); Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All 
Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families and Committee on the Rights of the Child, 
Joint General Comment No 4 and No 23: State Obligations Regarding the Human Rights of 
Children in the Context of International Migration in Countries of Origin, Transit, 
Destination and Return, UN Doc CMW/C/GC/4-CRC/C/GC/23 (16 November 2017); 
Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their 
Families, General Comment No 2: The Rights of Migrant Workers in an Irregular Situation 
and Members of Their Families, UN Doc CMW/C/GC/2 (28 August 2013). 
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The importance of registration and documentation have also been emphasised 
at regional level. In its leading decision concerning the Dominican Republic, the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights ruled that the two complainants had been 
placed ‘in fear of being expelled by the State of which they were nationals and 
separated from their families owing to the absence of a birth certificate’, and found 
the Dominican Republic in violation of multiple articles of the American 
Convention on Human Rights, including the right to nationality, to recognition as 
a person before the law, and to the protection of children and the family.26 The 
African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights has heard repeated cases 
relating to the refusal to recognise a person as a national who had previously held 
identity documents confirming nationality, finding violations of numerous articles 
of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.27 The African Committee 
of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, responsible for the African 
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, has emphasised the importance of 
birth registration and the right to a nationality in cases against Kenya and Sudan, 
and in a comprehensive General Comment.28 The African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights has confirmed the Commission’s view that the right to a 
nationality is implied by the protection for dignity and legal status in art 5 of the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, which is violated by the refusal 
to renew or issue documents.29 The European Court of Human Rights has also 
ruled, in a case concerning stateless individuals in Slovenia, that the ‘erasure’ of 
their registration as residents and the destruction of their identity documents had 
‘deprived the applicants of their legal status’ and accordingly violated their right 
to private and family life.30  
International law is clear, therefore, that the right to ‘identity’ encompasses not 
only birth registration but also registration of other elements of identity, including 
nationality — and, in some contexts, other forms of legal status in a country. 
However, the current international legal framework places only limited 
restrictions on the discretion of states to determine who are their nationals. 
Historically, the concern was largely the imposition of nationality without a 
person’s (implied) consent.31 Today, attention has shifted to the avoidance of 
 
26   Case of the Girls Yean and Bosico v Dominican Republic (Judgment) (Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights, Series C 130, 8 September 2005) 65–66 [173]. 
27   See Bronwen Manby, Citizenship Law in Africa: A Comparative Study (3rd edn, Open Society 
Foundations 2016) 33–36. 
28   African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, General Comment No 
2: Article 6 of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child — ‘Right to a Name, 
Birth Registration and a Nationality’, Doc No ACERWC/ GC/ 02 (7–16 April 2014); African 
Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, Decision on the 
Communication Submitted by the Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa and 
Open Society Justice Initiative on behalf of Children of Nubian Descent in Kenya v Kenya, 
Doc No 002/Com/002/2009 (22 March 2011); African Committee of Experts on the Rights 
and Welfare of the Child, Decision on the Communication Submitted by the African Centre 
of Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS) and People’s Legal Aid Centre (PLACE) v Republic of 
Sudan, Doc No 005/Com/001/2015 (31 May 2018). 
29   Anudo Ochieng Anudo v United Republic of Tanzania (African Court on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, App No 012/2015, 22 March 2018); Robert John Penessis v United Republic of 
Tanzania (African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, App No 013/2015, 28 November 
2019). 
30   Kurić v Slovenia [2012] IV Eur Court HR 1, [356]; see also Smirnova v Russia [2003] IX Eur 
Court HR 241, 250 [96]. 
31   Paul Weis, Nationality and Statelessness in International Law (2nd edn, Brill 1979) 95–115. 
See also Bronwen Manby, ‘Nationality and Statelessness among Persons of Western Saharan 
Origin’ (2020) 34(1) Journal of Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Law 9. 




statelessness and discrimination. The most important specific obligation placed on 
states for the reduction of statelessness is to grant nationality to a child born in the 
territory who is otherwise stateless; that is, who does not acquire a nationality from 
one of the parents — at least for those states that are parties to the American 
Convention on Human Rights, the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of 
the Child, or the UN Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness.32 
Discrimination based on gender in transmission of nationality to children and 
spouses is prohibited by the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women.33 Discrimination based on racial, ethnic or 
religious grounds is more difficult to prohibit, given the nature of nationality based 
on descent, although it is increasingly frowned upon.34 It is here that many 
problems of statelessness originate.35 
Even for those states that have the minimum protections against statelessness, 
the challenge is to prove that a child is ‘otherwise stateless’: how do you prove a 
negative? What documents must the parents produce (or prove that they cannot 
obtain), for their child to acquire their nationality or the nationality of the state of 
birth? The devil in the detail of the procedures for registration of legal identity 
shows its horns.  
 CIVIL REGISTRATION AND CONFLICTS OF LAW 
There is extensive international guidance on the implementation of birth 
registration, within a broader framework of civil registration.36 Yet neither the 
SDG target on legal identity nor the UNHCR Global Action Plan to End 
 
32   For a general outline of the international law obligations, see, eg, Serena Forlati, ‘Nationality 
as a Human Right’ in Alessandra Annoni and Serena Forlati (eds), The Changing Role of 
Nationality in International Law (Routledge 2013); Alice Edwards, ‘The Meaning of 
Nationality in International Law in an Era of Human Rights: Procedural and Substantive 
Aspects’ in Alice Edwards and Laura van Waas (eds), Nationality and Statelessness under 
International Law (Cambridge University Press 2014); Peter J Spiro, ‘Citizenship, 
Nationality, and Statelessness’ in Vincent Chetail and Céline Bauloz (eds), Research 
Handbook on International Law and Migration (Edward Elgar Publishing 2014). 
33   Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, opened for 
signature 18 December 1979, 1249 UNTS 13 (entered into force 3 September 1981) art 9 
(‘CEDAW’). 
34   Peter J Spiro, ‘A New International Law of Citizenship’ (2011) 105(4) American Journal of 
International Law 694; Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General 
Recommendation XXX on Discrimination against Non-Citizens, UN Doc A/59/18 (2–20 
August 2004) 93 [469]. 
35   This Is Our Home: Stateless Minorities and Their Search for Citizenship (Report, UNHCR 
November 2017) <https://www.unhcr.org/ibelong/stateless-minorities/>; Fernand de 
Varennes, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Minority Issues: Statelessness: A Minority 
Issue, UN Doc A/73/205 (20 July 2018); E Tendayi Achiume, Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and 
Related Intolerance: Racial Discrimination in the Context of Citizenship, Nationality and 
Immigration Status, UN Doc A/HRC/38/52 (25 April 2018). 
36   Most authoritatively, Principles and Recommendations for a Vital Statistics System 
(Statistical Papers Series M No 19/Rev.3, United Nations Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs Statistics Division 2014) (‘Principles and Recommendations for a Vital Statistics 
System’) <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/standmeth/principles/M19Rev3en.pdf>.  
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Statelessness 2014–2024 mention the recording of other life events in a 
comprehensive civil registration system.37  
Registration of marriages (or civil partnerships), adoptions and guardianships, 
changes of name, divorces and other cessation of these statuses, and deaths, may 
be as critical to assert rights based on identity as birth registration. This includes 
the right to the nationality of a particular state. Birth in or out of wedlock — most 
often defined as a formally registered marriage — may create different rights for 
children to acquire nationality or to inherit property, dependent on the systems for 
recognition and registration of parentage. Care of a child without registration of a 
formal adoption or other legal relationship may leave the child rightless within the 
foster family, and if the child has origins in another country, also stateless. 
Registration of the death of a pre-deceased parent may be necessary for birth 
registration to take place, for the child’s nationality and other rights to be 
recognised, or for a spouse to claim a pension or other benefits.  
The problem with adopting a target for complete civil registration coverage is, 
first and foremost, the obvious unattainability of such a target in very many 
countries within the timeframe of the SDGs. But it is equally challenging to 
formulate an indicator that would accommodate the immense complexity of civil 
registration systems around the world. The definition of civil registration 
employed by the UN is clear that uniformity is indeed not expected across states:  
civil registration is defined as the continuous, permanent, compulsory and universal 
recording of the occurrence and characteristics of vital events pertaining to the 
population, as provided through decree or regulation in accordance with the legal 
requirements in each country.38 
What are these legal requirements? It is possible to start with the very general 
sorting of civil registration frameworks into civil and common law systems. Legal 
systems within the civil, or Romano-Germanic, legal tradition tend to be 
comfortable with comprehensive and centralised civil registration as the basis for 
recognition of legal capacity and status within the family: incorporating not only 
registration of births and deaths, but also adoptions, marriages, divorces and 
changes of name. The Nordic states are among those that have taken this approach 
the furthest, integrating civil registration into a national population register in 
which other family relationships are also recorded.39 The common law systems 
found in Britain and its former colonies, however, tend historically to have 
managed official identity and interactions with the state through multiple registers 
 
37   SDG indicator 17.19.2 includes the ‘proportion of countries that … (b) have achieved 100 per 
cent birth registration and 80 per cent death registration’. This indicator relates not to legal 
identity, however, but to Target 17.19 on statistical capacity-building, falling under SDG 17, 
on the need to ‘revitalize global partnerships for sustainable development’. See, ‘Sustainable 
Development Goal 17’, United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs 
Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform (Web Page, 2015) 
<https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg17>. See also Global Action Plan to End 
Statelessness: 2014–2024 (Report, UNHCR 2014) action 7: Ensure birth registration for the 
prevention of statelessness’ <https://www.unhcr.org/en-
au/protection/statelessness/54621bf49/global-action-plan-end-statelessness-2014-
2024.html>. 
38   Principles and Recommendations for a Vital Statistics System (n 36) 65 [279] (emphasis 
added). 
39   Ian Watson, ‘An Unusually Open Identification Number System: The Icelandic Kennitala’ in 
Ilsen About, James Brown and Gayle Lonergan (eds), Identification and Registration 
Practices in Transnational Perspective: People, Papers and Practices (Palgrave Macmillan 
2013) 132. 




maintained for different purposes (though with the possibility of cross-checks to 
prevent fraud). Thus a former French territory will have a code on civil status or a 
family code including comprehensive rules on all forms of civil registration, as 
well as rules on adoption, or establishing parentage in case of children born out of 
wedlock; and in some cases also regulating nationality. A former British territory 
is likely to have a births and deaths registration act, and separate laws on marriage, 
adoption and citizenship, and perhaps a separate child law also.40  
The detailed variations of civil registration laws, however, undermine this 
simple binary.41 There are hybrid civil–common law countries (where the 
colonising power changed); while Islamic and (formerly) communist societies 
have their own important variants, as do states that have sought to formalise 
recognition of customary law, or those where civil registration is rather at the 
family or household level. The construction of civil registration systems both 
reflects and shapes deeply held social norms about the nature of the family, 
property rights, and belonging. The efforts of governments to establish or reform 
registration systems have therefore also created consternation among populations 
cleaving to different conceptions of the family, marriage and the rights of 
children;42 these clashes have often been visible in the efforts of colonial officials 
to register ‘native’ populations.43 Anxieties about attribution of status to 
abandoned children have been perennial;44 as have those on the recognition of the 
fathers of children born out of wedlock.45 The more recent development of civil 
registration frameworks reflects the profound influence of human rights law and 
norms of non-discrimination on concepts of the family.46 Civil registration laws 
encode the social acceptance (or not) of same-sex partnerships and parenting,47 or 
the right of indigenous peoples to self-identify.48  
 
40   In this article, nationality and citizenship are used interchangeably; nationality in relation to 
international law and, at national level, the term in relevant laws or usage in the document 
being referred to. 
41   Vernon Valentine Palmer, ‘Mixed Legal Systems’ in Mauro Bussani and Ugo Mattei (eds), 
The Cambridge Companion to Comparative Law (Cambridge University Press 2012) 368. 
42   Neil J Diamant, ‘Making Love “Legible” in China: Politics and Society during the 
Enforcement of Civil Marriage Registration, 1950–66’ (2001) 29(3) Politics & Society 447; 
Osamu Saito and Masahiro Sato, ‘Japan’s Civil Registration Systems before and after the 
Meiji Restoration’ in Breckenridge and Szreter (n 5) 113.  
43   Frederick Cooper, ‘Voting, Welfare and Registration: The Strange Fate of the État-Civil in 
French Africa, 1945–1960’ in Breckenridge and Szreter (n 5) 385. 
44   Nazan Maksudyan, ‘The Fight over Nobody’s Children: Religion, Nationality and Citizenship 
of Foundlings in the Late Ottoman Empire’ (2009) 41(Fall) New Perspectives on Turkey 151; 
Katherine O’Donovan, ‘Interpretations of Children’s Identity Rights’ in Deirdre Fottrell (ed), 
Revisiting Children’s Rights: 10 years of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(Kluwer Law International 2000) 73; Sari K Ishii, ‘Access to Citizenship for Abandoned 
Children: How Migrants’ Children Become “Stateless” in Japanese Orphanages’ (2020) 46 
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 1. 
45   Marie-Therese Meulders-Klein, ‘The Position of the Father in European Legislation’ (1990) 
4(2) International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 131. 
46   Fareda Banda and John Eekelaar, ‘International Conceptions of the Family’ (2017) 66(4) 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 833. 
47   Carl Stychin, ‘Family Friendly? Rights, Responsibilities and Relationship Recognition’ in 
Alison Diduck and Katherine O’Donovan (eds), Feminist Perspectives on Family Law 
(Routledge 2006) 21. 
48   Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No 11: Indigenous Children and 
Their Rights under the Convention, UN Doc CRC/C/GC/11 (12 February 2009); Richard 
Madden et al, ‘Indigenous Identification: Past, Present and a Possible Future’ (2019) 35(1) 
Statistical Journal of the IAOS 23. 
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The legal identity field is vastly complicated by these sensitivities and 
differences of legal approach. It can be difficult enough to manage legal and 
cultural pluralism within the registration systems of one country. When state 
boundaries are crossed, the challenges are multiplied. The recognition of civil 
status documents issued by one set of authorities in other countries is managed by 
national rules that are as varied as the rules for civil registration itself.  
Depending on the country, an assortment of official copies of parental birth, 
death or marriage certificates may be required to register a child’s birth. If the 
child’s birth is in a different country from the one where these documents were 
issued, the official copies must be obtained from the country of origin, presented 
in a form accepted by the host country and usually transcribed into its national 
records. Non-recognition of a foreign-registered civil status event means that it 
lacks legal effect, leaving (for example) marriages invalid in one country or the 
other, or still in place despite a registered divorce. If a person’s civil status 
documents are not recognised in another jurisdiction, the rights that depend on 
these documents may also be unrecognised: the same child may therefore be born 
in wedlock for the authorities of one country and out-of-wedlock for another.49 
On top of these challenges related to registration in the country of birth, consular 
registration and/or transcription into the records of the state of origin is in many 
cases necessary if the child’s right to the nationality of one or both parents is to be 
recognised. It is also likely that the parents will need a valid passport or other 
identity document, and if neither is a national of the country where their child is 
born, often also a visa showing legal presence in the country.50 A finding of an 
error at any stage in these processes can sometimes result in the retroactive loss of 
nationality apparently held legitimately over many years.51 
Already exhausting for legal migrants in the formal sector, for refugees and 
irregular migrants of few resources (financial or social) these games of paperchase 
make the recognition of legal identity and nationality ever more fragile.52  
These problems of conflicts of law place us in the domain of The Hague 
Conference of Private International Law (‘The Hague Conference’), an 85-
member international organisation established in 1955 with the objective ‘to work 
for the progressive unification of the rules of private international law’.53 The 
Hague Conference has undertaken some efforts to simplify the mutual recognition 
 
49   In a case before the United Kingdom courts, an applicant was left stateless when Mauritius 
did not accept that she was her father’s legitimate daughter on the basis of the documents 
produced; while the UK did, which meant that she had not retained British citizenship when 
Mauritius became independent: R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p 
Mahaboob Bibi [1985] Imm AR 134, affirmed by the Court of Appeal at [1987] Imm AR 340, 
discussed in Laurie Fransman, Adrian Berry and Alison Harvey, Fransman’s British 
Nationality Law (3rd edn, Bloomsbury Professional 2011) ch 8.12. 
50   Bronwen Manby, Preventing Statelessness among Migrants and Refugees: Birth Registration 
and Consular Assistance in Egypt and Morocco (LSE Middle East Centre Paper Series No 
27, 2019). 
51   Gerard-René de Groot and Patrick Wautelet, Reflections on Quasi-Loss of Nationality in 
Comparative, International and European Perspective (CEPS Papers in Liberty and Security 
in Europe No 66, Centre for European Policy Studies August 2014) 
<https://www.ceps.eu/ceps-publications/reflections-quasi-loss-nationality-comparative-
international-and-european-perspective/>. 
52   Pardis Mahdavi, Crossing the Gulf: Love and Family in Migrant Lives (Stanford University 
Press 2016); Catherine Allerton, ‘Impossible Children: Illegality and Excluded Belonging 
among Children of Migrants in Sabah, East Malaysia’ (2018) 44(7) Journal of Ethnic and 
Migration Studies 1081. 
53   Statute of The Hague Conference on Private International Law (The Hague Conference on 
Private International Law, entered into force 19 July 1955) art 1. 




of civil registration documents, most importantly through the adoption of the 1961 
Convention to Abolish the Requirements of Legalisation for Foreign Public 
Documents (‘Apostille Convention’).54 More recently it has launched an initiative 
to facilitate the recognition of foreign judicial decisions relating to parentage, in 
particular in the new context of international surrogacy arrangements.55 The 
Commission Internationale de l’État Civil (International Commission on Civil 
Status) (‘ICCS’), an intergovernmental organisation established in 1950, aims 
specifically ‘to facilitate international cooperation in civil status matters’ and has 
adopted 34 conventions to that effect, including Convention No 13 of 1973 aimed 
at reducing statelessness caused by gender discrimination in nationality law; 
Convention No 16 of 1976 on multilingual certificates; and Convention No 17 of 
1977, with objectives similar to the Apostille Convention for the reduction of the 
burden of legalisation of foreign documents.56 In 2010, the ICCS published a study 
on the comparative laws and policies of its 15 member states (at that time), 
highlighting the great variation in relation to proof of civil status for irregular 
migrants.57 But the ICCS has gradually lost support and had only six member 
states as of 2020; its relevance diminished, it seems, by low levels of ratification 
of its treaties, the lack of political backing from some core states and the 
overlapping of different institutional efforts to resolve these questions. Most 
(current or former) ICCS states are members of the European Union, and since 
1997 the Court of Justice of the European Union has held that the certificates and 
other documents issued by one EU member state must be recognised by other 
member states, ‘unless their accuracy is seriously undermined by concrete 
evidence relating to the individual case in question’.58 More recently, the EU has 
attempted to take steps to resolve the ‘extremely complex international legal 
 
54   Convention to Abolish the Requirement of Legalisation for Foreign Public Documents (The 
Hague Conference on Private International Law, opened for signature 5 October 1961, entered 
into force 24 January 1965). 
55   The Hague Conference of Private International Law, Parentage/Surrogacy Project, launched 
2011, documents collected at: Experts’ Group on the Parentage/Surrogacy Project, ‘The 
Parentage/Surrogacy Project’, The Hague Conference of Private International Law (Web 
Page) <https://www.hcch.net/en/projects/legislative-projects/parentage-surrogacy>. See, eg, 
Advisory Opinion Concerning the Recognition in Domestic Law of a Legal Parent–Child 
Relationship between a Child Born through a Gestational Surrogacy Arrangement Abroad 
and the Intended Mother (Requested by the French Court of Cassation) (Advisory Opinion) 
(European Court of Human Rights, Request No P16-2018–001, 10 April 2019). 
56   Convention No 13 to Reduce the Number of Cases of Statelessness (International Commission 
on Civil Status, opened for signature 13 September 1973) (‘Convention No 13’). Convention 
No 13 had seven states parties; now superseded by CEDAW (n 33). Convention No 16 on the 
Issue of Multilingual Extracts from Civil Status Records (International Commission on Civil 
Status, opened for signature 8 September 1976) (‘Convention No 16’). Convention No 16 has 
24 states parties, the most widely ratified and used. Convention No 17 on the Exemption from 
Legalisation of Certain Records and Documents (International Commission on Civil Status, 
opened for signature 15 September 1977) (‘Convention No 17’). Convention No 17 has 10 
states parties. Conventions 26 to 34, the most recent, have less than five ratifications each, see 
generally ‘Conventions’, International Commission on Civil Status (Web Page) 
<http://www.ciec1.org/>. For an outline of the work of the Commission see Chantal Nast, 
‘Aspects d’état civil: aperçu des activités de la Commission Internationale de l’État Civil’ 
(Colloque, Centre de Droit Privé Fondamental, Université de Strasbourg 7 December 2012) 
<http://cdpf.unistra.fr/fileadmin/upload/CDPF/Colloques/La_reforme_du_nom_de_l_enfant
_et_de_l_autorite_parentale/CIEC-CNast_Colloque_7.12.2012.pdf>. 
57   Persons Deprived of Civil-Status and Identity Documents (“Undocumented Migrants”) 
(Memorandum, International Commission on Civil Status October 2010). 
58   Eftalia Dafeki v Landesversicherungsanstalt Württemberg (C-336/94) [1997] ECR I-06761, 
[21]. 
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mosaic’ in relation to civil status documents,59 and an EU regulation came into 
force in 2019 that aims to reduce costs and shorten lengthy procedures for mutual 
recognition of a range of public documents.60 But all these efforts are limited in 
their ambition and scope: not even the EU regulation aims to harmonise the great 
variety of policy rules among member states regarding verification of facts stated 
in foreign civil status documents.61 
Agreements on the regulation of private international law thus seem to have the 
potential to resolve these issues, to ‘focus the analysis on the migrant as an 
individual rather than on the state’s interests’ when it comes to global migration 
governance.62 But progress so far is not encouraging. 
Public international law, moreover, provides no right to the consular assistance 
that is needed by a person navigating these cross-border registration labyrinths. It 
protects the right of a state to assist its nationals (should it so wish), and the rights 
of migrants to be informed of the availability of the assistance that does exist, but 
does not establish an obligation for states to provide assistance.63 There is only a 
somewhat limp commitment in the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular 
Migration of 2018, to ‘ensure adequate, timely, reliable and accessible consular 
documentation to our nationals residing in other countries, including identity and 
travel documents’.64 The language was watered down from the initial draft in order 
to reduce the focus on rights and increase the focus on control.65 
 
59   Mariolina Eliantonio, Silvia Brunello and Hanno von Freyhold, Life in Cross-Border 
Situations in the EU: A Comparative Study on Civil Status (Study, European Parliament 
Committee on Legal Affairs February 2013) ch 2.1 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2013/474395/IPOL-
JURI_ET(2013)474395_EN.pdf>. See also Birgit Feldtmann et al, Facilitating Life Events 
(Final Report, European Commission, DG JLS – Directorate-General for Justice, Freedom 
and Security October 2008) 
<http://www.freyvial.de/Publications/Civil_Status_in_Europe_Fullreport.pdf> and the work 
of the European Association of Civil Registrars <https://evs-eu.org/en/explanations/>.  
60   Regulation (EU) 2016/1191 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016 on 
Promoting the Free Movement of Citizens by Simplifying the Requirements for Presenting 
Certain Public Documents in the European Union and Amending Regulation (EU) No 
1024/2012 [2016] OJ L 200/1. See also Alenka Prvinšek Persoglio, ‘State Obligation to 
Establish Legal Identity in Comparative Perspective’, London School of Economics Middle 
East Centre (Blog Post, 1 May 2019) <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2019/05/01/state-
obligation-to-establish-legal-identity-in-comparative-perspective/>. 
61   Gerard-René de Groot and David de Groot, ‘Recognition of Civil Status (Certificates), with 
Special Attention to Secondary Recognition of Documents Already Recognized in Another 
Member State’ in André Janssen and Hans Schulte-Nölke (eds), Researches in European 
Private Law and Beyond — Contributions in Honour of Reiner Schulze’s Seventieth Birthday 
(Nomos 2020) 283. 
62   Sabine Corneloup, ‘Can Private International Law Contribute to Global Migration 
Governance?’ in Horatia Muir Watt and Diego P Fernández Arroyo (eds), Private 
International Law and Global Governance (Oxford University Press 2014) 301, 302. 
63   Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, opened for signature 24 April 1963, 596 UNTS 
261 (entered into force 19 March 1967) art 5; International Convention on the Protection of 
the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, opened for signature 18 
December 1990, 2220 UNTS 3 (entered into force 1 July 2003), arts 7, 65(2); The Right to 
Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of the Due Process 
of Law (Advisory Opinion) (Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Series A No 16, 1 
October 1999). 
64   Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, GA Res 73/195, UN GOAR, 73rd 
sess, Agenda Items 14 and 119, UN Doc A/RES/73/195 (11 January 2019, adopted 19 
December 2018) annex 12 [20(c)]. 
65   Amal de Chickera, ‘GCM Commentary: Objective 4: Ensure That All Migrants Have Proof 
of Legal Identity and Adequate Documentation’, Refugee Law Initiative Blog (Blog Post, 8 
November 2018) <https://rli.blogs.sas.ac.uk/2018/11/08/gcm-commentary-objective-4/>. 




The situation of refugees and their children is particularly challenging.66 There 
are provisions in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees intended 
to govern the recognition or substitution of personal status documents issued in 
another country or that would normally be obtained from a consulate, but little 
guidance on the practical steps required to fulfil these obligations.67 Even if 
substitute documents are issued, states do not always accord them the same status 
as originals.68 UNHCR will attempt to facilitate birth registration for the children 
of refugees, but it is the host government that must carry this out.69 A refugee 
status document will usually serve as sufficient proof of identity and legal status 
in the host country, enabling births and other civil status events to be registered 
there. However, a person seeking to register a birth may also require consular 
assistance to obtain copies of the other documents required (such as a marriage 
certificate, or the death certificate of the other spouse, if relevant). In some cases 
where a person seeks documents from a consulate, the host country may consider 
that the refugee ‘voluntarily re-availed himself of the protection of the country of 
nationality’ and therefore, though UNHCR urges otherwise, that refugee 
protection ceases to apply.70 For the same reasons, refugees cannot generally 
approach the authorities of their country of origin in order to transcribe 
information in a birth certificate into that country’s registers, since to do so would 
put their refugee status at risk, or (even if not officially recognised as refugees) 
they may be afraid of the consequences. These difficulties mean that the 
nationality of refugee children born outside their parents’ state of nationality often 
remains legally uncertain, unless the host country provides a right to nationality 
based on birth and/or residence in the country.71 Even if parents and child can 
 
66   Jinske Verhellen, ‘Cross-Border Portability of Refugees’ Personal Status’ (2018) 31(4) 
Journal of Refugee Studies 427; Vincent Chetail, ‘Les relations entre droit international privé 
et droit international des réfugiés: histoire d’une brève rencontre’ (2014) 141(2) Journal du 
Droit International 447. 
67   Article 12 of the Convention relates to recognition of personal status, while art 25 provides 
for states to provide administrative assistance to refugees, including delivery of ‘such 
documents or certifications as would normally be delivered to aliens by or through their 
national authorities’: Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 28 
July 1951, 189 UNTS 150 (entered into force 22 April 1954), (‘1951 Refugee Convention’). 
See also James C Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law (Cambridge 
University Press 2005) chs 3.2.4, 4.10. Article 25 is also considered in Summary Conclusions: 
Expert Roundtable on the Right to Family Life and Family Unity in the Context of Family 
Reunification of Refugees and Other Persons in Need of International Protection (Report, 
UNHCR 4 December 2017); Frances Nicholson, ‘The “Essential Right” to Family Unity of 
Refugees and Others in Need of International Protection in the Context of Family 
Reunification’ (Legal and Protection Policy Research Series, UNHCR 2018). Similar 
provisions to those in the 1951 Refugee Convention are included within arts 12 and 25 of the 
1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons; there is no guidance on these 
obligations for stateless persons who are not also refugees: Convention Relating to the Status 
of Stateless Persons, opened for signature 28 September 1954, 360 UNTS 117 (entered into 
force 6 June 1960).  
68   A point considered in relation to family reunification in Tanda-Muzinga v France (European 
Court of Human Rights, Chamber, Application No 2260/10, 10 July 2014). 
69   UNHCR Executive Committee, Conclusion on Civil Registration (No 111 (LXIV), 17 
October 2013). 
70   Article 1C of the 1951 Refugee Convention (n 67) provides that: ‘This Convention shall cease 
to apply to any person falling under the terms of section A if: (1) He has voluntarily re-availed 
himself of the protection of the country of his nationality;…’. For commentary, see Handbook 
on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status and Guidelines on International 
Protection under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees (Reissued, UNHCR 2019) 30 [121].  
71   Gábor Gyulai, ‘The Long-Overlooked Mystery of Refugee Children’s Nationality’, The 
World’s Stateless: Children (Report, Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion February 2017). 
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return to the country of origin, exceptional procedures may be needed to recognise 
the child’s status in the absence of consular registration and transcription of a birth 
certificate.72  
 CIVIL REGISTRATION IN THE UN SYSTEM  
The UN system has historically not done much to address these challenges. Civil 
registration is ‘owned’ by the Statistical Commission, whose secretariat is the 
Statistics Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs. The 
function of civil registration, the legal registration of vital events, is combined with 
the collection of vital statistics based on that registration, to provide information 
on the population of a country.  
The first edition of the UN Handbook of Vital Statistics Methods, published in 
1955, emphasised the primary value of civil registration as legal, and only 
secondarily as a source of vital statistics. In poorer countries where civil 
registration coverage is incomplete, surveys are more practical tools to gather 
information needed for government planning.73 But the housing of international 
coordination of efforts to improve civil registration within the statistical arm of 
the UN led the statistics aspects of what came to be known as civil registration and 
vital statistics (‘CRVS’) to dominate, important as they are to richer countries 
where registration is nearly complete, for the purposes of state planning and to 
guide interventions in public health (especially through registration of cause of 
death).74 Only a 1998 publication on preparation of a legal framework placed 
stronger emphasis on registration of legal status and protection of individual 
rights.75 The current UN Principles and Recommendations for a Vital Statistics 
System, adopted in 2014, continue to note that ‘the essential purpose of civil 
registration is to furnish legal instruments of direct interest to individuals’;76 but a 
scant handful of pages in the 150 page document relate to the legal aspect.  
Civil registration for whatever purpose was for many decades a generally 
neglected part of the international agenda. This changed around the turn of the 
millennium. UNICEF placed new emphasis on the importance of birth registration 
 
72   For the situation of the ‘red-coded’ former Liberian refugees in West Africa, see Bronwen 
Manby, Nationality, Migration and Statelessness in West Africa (Study, UNHCR and 
International Organisation for Migration 2015) 
<https://www.unhcr.org/ecowas2015/Nationality-Migration-and-Statelessness-in-West-
Africa-REPORT-EN.pdf>. 
73   Statistical Office of the United Nations, Handbook of Vital Statistics Methods (United 
Nations, Studies in Methods Series F No 7, 1955) ch 1(B) 
<https://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic-social/Standards-and-
Methods/files/Handbooks/crvs/Series_F7-E.pdf>. 
74   van der Straaten (n 8) 20–21. 
75   United Nations Statistics Division, Handbook on Civil Registration and Vital Statistics 
Systems: Preparation of a Legal Framework (United Nations, Studies in Methods Series F 
No 71, 1998) ch 1 <https://unstats.un.org/unsd/publication/SeriesF/SeriesF_71E.pdf>. The 
Handbook also raised concerns about the issue of a single number to a person, which ‘removes 
the personal characteristics that have traditionally served to establish a person’s identity’: at 
16 [39]. 
76   Principles and Recommendations for a Vital Statistics System (n 36) 66 [286]. 




for child protection.77 Plan International conducted a major global campaign on 
birth registration from 2005 to 2009, launched by Archbishop Desmond Tutu.78 
The Lancet published a ground-breaking series of articles in 2007 that drew 
attention to the ‘scandal of invisibility’ caused by lack of civil registration, and 
described the neglect of global CRVS systems as ‘the single most critical failure 
of development over the past 30 years’.79 The Inter-American Development Bank 
also took up civil registration as an important issue both for economic 
development and for individual access to essential services such as health and 
education.80 An initiative to improve lamentable rates of civil registration in 
Africa was launched by a consortium of international agencies with the African 
Union in 2010.81 In late 2014, governments in the Asia-Pacific region proclaimed 
a ‘CRVS Decade’ (2015–24).82 This growing consensus contributed to the 
recognition of ‘legal identity’ and birth registration within the SDGs. 
 LEGAL IDENTITY, DIGITAL IDENTITY AND DEVELOPMENT 
Development actors have now taken up the ‘legal identity’ SDG target with 
enthusiasm. In 2014, the World Bank created a unit to coordinate its work on 
‘identification for development’, recognising that lack of identity documents can 
create significant social and economic exclusion, and thus form a drag on 
 
77   Unity Dow, ‘Birth Registration: The “First” Right’ in Catharine Way (ed), The Progress of 
Nations: The Nations of the World Ranked According to Their Achievements in Fulfilment of 
Child Rights and Progress for Women (UNICEF 1998) 
<https://www.unicef.org/about/history/files/pub_pon98_en.pdf>; United Nations Children’s 
Fund, ‘Birth Registration Right from the Start’, Innocenti Digest (March 2002) 
<https://www.unicef-irc.org/publications/pdf/digest9e.pdf>. 
78   Claire Cody, Count Every Child: The Right to Birth Registration (Campaign Report, Plan 
International, 2009); Simon Heap and Claire Cody, ‘The Universal Birth Registration 
Campaign’ (2009) 32(April) Forced Migration Review 20. 
79  Richard Horton, ‘Counting for Health’ (2007) 370(9598) The Lancet 1526. The full series can 
be viewed online: see ‘Who Counts?’, The Lancet (Web Page, 30 October 2007) 
<https://www.thelancet.com/series/who-counts>. The series was updated in 2015: see 
‘Counting Births and Deaths’, The Lancet (Web Page, 11 May 2015) 
<http://www.thelancet.com/series/counting-births-and-deaths>. 
80   See, eg, Mia Harbitz, ‘The Civil Registry: A Neglected Dimension of International 
Development’ (Technical Note No IDB-TN-542, Inter-American Development Bank May 
2013) <https://publications.iadb.org/publications/english/document/The-Civil-Registry-A-
Neglected-Dimension-of-International-Development.pdf>; Mia Harbitz and Bettina Boekle-
Giuffrida, Democratic Governance, Citizenship, and Legal Identity: Linking Theoretical 




81   Africa Programme on Accelerated Improvement of Civil Registration and Vital Statistics 
(Web Page) <http://www.apai-crvs.org/>. 
82   See Asian and Pacific Civil Registration and Vital Statistics Decade 2015–2024 (Report, Get 
Everyone in the Picture 2015) 
<https://getinthepicture.org/sites/default/files/resources/Asian_and_Pacific_Civil_Registrati
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economic development generally.83 Development think tanks agree with this 
assessment.84  
Important as birth registration is recognised to be, however, achieving complete 
coverage of a population by improving registration at the time of birth would 
necessarily involve a wait of 70 years or more. Although an effort to improve late 
registration of births and other events is a potential solution (successfully 
implemented in South Africa, for example),85 the emphasis has shifted to the 
broader, undefined, target.86 Technical professionals also tend towards a certain 
impatience with the complexities of legal status in private or public international 
law. The rapid advance of digital technology leads many to the conclusion that the 
best way to achieve the SDG legal identity target is ‘through digital identity 
systems, central registries storing personal data in digital form and credentials that 
rely on digital, rather than physical, mechanisms to authenticate the identity of 
their holder’.87 Low-income countries can, it is argued, ‘leapfrog’ the paper-based 
stage, and move straight to digital identification.88 Data protection is recognised 
as a concern, but one that can be managed.89 In practice, digital identification 
programmes, most often based on biometrics, are being rolled out at a ‘dizzying 
pace across the developing world’ — with or without the support of traditional 
development agencies.90 Among the actors that have jumped on the ‘legal identity’ 
target are biometric tech companies, sometimes interested more in rent-seeking 
 
83   Vyjayanti T Desai, Anna Diofasi Metz and Jing Lu, ‘The Global Identification Challenge: 
Who Are the 1 Billion People without Proof of Identity?’, World Bank Blogs (Blog Post, 25 
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84   Elizabeth Stuart et al, ‘The Data Revolution: Finding the Missing Millions’ (Research Report 
No 3, Overseas Development Institute April 2015) 
<https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/9604.pdf>; 
Gelb and Diofasi Metz (n 9).  
85   Jaap van der Straaten and Anna Zita Metz, South Africa ID Case Study (Working Paper No 
137142, World Bank, 1 May 2019) 
<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/315081558706143827/South-Africa-ID-Case-
Study>. 
86   The World Bank has produced a dataset on the numbers of people without ‘proof of legal 
identity’ that provides a global estimate of one billion people without identity documents; but 
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coverage of birth registration or certificates for those over five years old: ‘Identification for 
Development (ID4D) Global Dataset’, The World Bank (Web Page, 2018) 
<https://id4d.worldbank.org/global-dataset>. 
87   Joseph J Atick et al, ‘Spotlight 4: Enabling Digital Development: Digital Identity’ in World 
Development Report 2016: Digital Dividends (Report, World Bank 2016) 194–97. 
88   Alan Gelb and Julia Clark, Identification for Development: The Biometrics Revolution 
(Working Paper No 315, Center for Global Development, 2013) 3, 46; World Development 
Report 2016: Digital Dividends (Report, World Bank 2016) 154. 
89   ID Enabling Environment Assessment: Guidance Note (Working Paper No 137288, World 
Bank, 1 January 2018) <https://id4d.worldbank.org/legal-assessment>; ‘Good ID Explained’, 
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than human rights or development91 — thus undermining the promised cost 
savings of digital ID.92  
One frequently cited example of the benefits of leapfrogging the overlong 
process of civil registration is the Indian Aadhaar (‘foundation’) program, 
established in 2009, which issues a 12-digit unique identity number to any resident 
of India, after collecting biometric data and other basic information.93 As of 2019, 
95 per cent of adults and 75 per cent of children in India — more than 1.2 billion 
people — had been issued an Aadhaar number.94 The Aadhaar register provides a 
short cut to proof of individual identity, concentrating only on uniqueness and not 
on other elements of identity; it seeks to sidestep difficult questions around 
determination of eligibility for citizenship, and bypasses the National Register of 
Citizens and national identity card proposed since 2003.95 The Aadhaar approach 
is favoured by the World Bank, and promoted elsewhere (for example in West 
Africa).96  
However, even as biometric registration programmes proceed apace, enrolment 
into new national registers has in other countries not been delinked from 
nationality. The legislation establishing national identity registers generally 
requires governments to record legal status — as citizen or alien — as part of the 
registration process, even if it also authorises the collection of biometric data (not 
always the case, even if biometric data is being collected). As these programmes 
are rolled out they are often accompanied by a strong assertion of biometric 
registration as a necessary component of national security, providing a ‘single 
source of truth’ for all personal data (a term derived from information systems 
design), to be certain that citizens are clearly distinguished from foreigners, and to 
eliminate fraudulent acquisition of documents and access to the benefits and rights 
granted to citizens.97 
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The dimension of citizenship thus cannot be ignored while still respecting the 
SDG objective to ‘leave no one behind’.98 
 THE DANGERS OF SHORT CUTS: POPULATION REGISTRATION AND THE 
CREATION OF STATELESSNESS 
The countries where new identity registers are expected to be of the greatest 
benefit to the economy, to the state and to individuals, are those where the highest 
percentage of the population is currently unregistered. The process of enrolling 
those with no pre-existing official documents into a national population register 
that records legal status in the country requires a multitude of individual decisions 
about that status, whether a person is a citizen or not; and if not a citizen, whether 
they have another status entitling them to remain in the country. But there are 
many millions of people in the world whose citizenship status is simply not clear: 
a smaller number than those without identity documents (for many of whom 
citizenship will be uncontroversial), but still a very substantial figure. Among 
them, those facing discrimination of various kinds may well be stateless — but 
this would only become apparent as requirements to acquire and produce 
documents become more pervasive. 
Where new systems are adopted without considering the underlying legal and 
policy frameworks on nationality and family relations there are risks of generating 
new forms of exclusion. Indeed, the creation of new population registers has 
always been a danger point for the creation of stateless populations. In Lebanon, 
Syria, and the Gulf States, the descendants of those who were not included in the 
population registries created at independence remain stateless today, even though 
their ancestors should have been entitled to nationality under the law.99 Similar 
problems arose when new registers were established in the successor states of the 
former Yugoslavia and Soviet Union.100 More recently, a campaign group 
representing black Mauritanians, Touche pas à ma nationalité, accused the 
Mauritanian government of ‘biometric genocide’ in its implementation of a new 
identity card system coupled with amendments to the nationality code in 2010.101 
In the Dominican Republic, support for new identity systems was instrumentalised 
as part of a drive to remove recognition of Dominican nationality from those of 
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Haitian descent.102 The new national number and biometric identity card 
introduced by Sudan since the secession of South Sudan in 2011 was in practice 
depriving people who had never considered themselves South Sudanese of their 
Sudanese nationality.103 Similar patterns have been visible in Kenya, Côte 
d’Ivoire and many other countries. At the same time, the long struggles for the 
establishment of independent electoral commissions to create fairer elections are 
being undermined by the move to make possession of a national identity card — 
under the firm control of the executive — a universal prerequisite to register to 
vote. The saving in cost by avoiding multiple registration processes has logic; but 
a lack of independent oversight of the determination of who is a citizen has its own 
non-financial costs. 
In countries with low rates of documentation, immigrant populations have 
historically been able to dissolve into the population by the simple route of change 
or choice of name.104 As official identities become fixed, this form of 
‘naturalisation’ is no longer possible, making gaps in the law on acquisition of 
nationality — at birth or later — ever more significant. And as multiple registries 
for different purposes are merged into one national database, the stakes of an entry 
on the register are raised; meaning that the exclusion of those whose status is 
perceived to be doubtful is also more likely. 
The World Bank’s Principles on Identification for Sustainable Development, 
endorsed by a wide range of international agencies and private sector actors, 
include a commitment to non-discrimination, to provide ‘legal identification to all 
residents — not just citizens’.105 This is a good principle. However, the 
commitment does not address the fact that universal coverage of identity 
documents that record legal status in the country is not at all empowering for those 
who fail whatever tests are imposed and are issued an identity number or card as 
a non-citizen (especially, but not only, if no other citizenship is simultaneously 
confirmed). For those individuals previously treated as citizens in most contexts, 
a registration process that determines that they are not citizens — coupled with a 
new requirement to produce ID for all official transactions — may well be worse 
than a situation where a much larger group was marginalised for lack of an identity 
document (even if those who now have a ‘citizen’ ID benefit as intended).  
This is the perceived attraction of adult registration processes delinked from 
legal status. But even the Aadhaar register in India, which in principle could avoid 
these problems, has proved impossible to roll out in regions where legal status is 
particularly controversial, most of all in the north-eastern state of Assam. At the 
same time, less than one per cent of those enrolled in Aadhaar did not already have 
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at least one form of identity document.106 The Aadhaar number has also not 
prevented, and perhaps facilitated, the politicisation of access to citizenship under 
the government of Narendra Modi, and the ‘screening out’ of minorities from 
entitlement to citizenship and an entry in the National Population Register and 
newly revived National Register of Citizens.107 The government is reported as 
intending to link the Aadhaar platform to the NRC, rather than preserving the 
separation of Aadhaar from citizenship, and to refuse Aadhaar numbers to those 
not in the NRC.108 Although one could imagine that the computerised record of 
identification and authentication provided by Aadhaar could in due course 
facilitate resolution of the more complex issues, by creating sufficient digital 
traces of a person’s existence over time to justify recognition of citizenship, this 
is not what has happened (or seems likely to happen) in practice. Meanwhile, 
average birth registration coverage — which records place and date of birth and 
identity of parents, on the basis of which citizenship could in most cases be 
determined, but also does not confirm legal status in the country — is now close 
to 90 per cent across India; and, in contrast to Aadhaar registration, reaches 100 
per cent in Assam.109 
 CONCLUSION: LEGAL IDENTITY, BIRTH REGISTRATION AND STATELESSNESS 
The first step to understanding the potential impact of the SDG Target 16.9 to 
‘provide legal identity’ is to gloss the meaning of this deceptively simple language. 
A person’s legal identity, the identity they have in law, is separate from the 
question of whether they have been formally identified and registered by state 
authorities. Target 16.9 is therefore best understood (if it is to have a positive 
impact) as an objective related to the obligation to enable proof of legal identity, 
through a process of registration, in most cases followed by issue of a token — 
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such as a birth certificate or an identity card — confirming that official 
registration.  
The UN responded to the World Bank’s initiatives by the establishment of an 
inter-agency Legal Identity Expert Group in 2018, which managed to come to an 
agreed definition of ‘legal identity’ — in language that underlines both the 
significance of the concept and the difficulty of tying down what it means in 
simple terms acceptable to all those interested in the outcome:  
Legal identity is defined as the basic characteristics of an individual's identity. e.g. 
name, sex, place and date of birth conferred through registration and the issuance 
of a certificate by an authorized civil registration authority following the occurrence 
of birth. In the absence of birth registration, legal identity may be conferred by a 
legally-recognized identification authority. This system should be linked to the civil 
registration system to ensure a holistic approach to legal identity from birth to 
death. Legal identity is retired by the issuance of a death certificate by the civil 
registration authority upon registration of death.110 
The definition, adopted for what is now the UN ‘Legal Identity Agenda’, 
highlights the importance of civil registration, in particular birth registration, to 
the idea of legal identity. Although it omits nationality as part of identity (by 
contrast to art 8 of the CRC), it pushes back against an approach based on 
biometric enrolment of any resident without distinction. If an adult registration 
process is undertaken, the UN considers it must be linked to the civil register rather 
than free standing: the Aadhaar approach thus does not ‘provide legal identity’ 
under this definition. This is important for those interested in the eradication of 
statelessness. Although birth registration does not (usually) record nationality or 
legal status in a country, it does record the information on the basis of which 
nationality, and many other rights, may be claimed. The ‘foundation’ it creates for 
recognition of a person’s legal identity is thus stronger (or ‘thicker’) than an 
approach based solely on biometric identifiers. Death registration is also important 
for the recognition of elements of the legal identity, and associated rights, of 
spouse and children (the legal identity of the deceased in fact lives on in this 
record). Civil registration generally, including marriage registration, is critical to 
legal status, especially for rights based on family connections, including 
nationality: this applies both in countries where nationality is attributed based on 
birth in the territory, and in those where legally recognised descent from a citizen 
(or a person resident in the country at a certain date) is the rule. 
Operational Guidelines were adopted under the auspices of the Legal Identity 
Expert Group in May 2020 for UN country teams, ‘to support a cohesive approach 
across the United Nations system’.111 This document continues the process of 
providing greater definitional clarity, and emphasises the importance of setting the 
SDG Target within a human rights framework, including the protection of 
migrants, refugees and the forcibly displaced. But although the difficulties created 
for migrants by lost or destroyed civil status documents are highlighted,112 the 
guidelines do not consider or propose solutions for the difficulties of cross-border 
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recognition of civil status documents, or the information that should be recorded 
in a birth register in the absence of existing documents. 
The UN Statistics Division published a new draft set of guidelines on a 
legislative framework for CRVS in January 2019, updating the 1998 version and 
expanding the scope, in order to take SDG Target 16.9 into account and provide a 
‘holistic and integrated approach to civil registration, vital statistics, and national 
identity management’.113 The guidelines mark an important departure, proposing 
a ‘rights-based approach to CRVS legal frameworks’, and urging states to ensure 
that their citizenship laws are ‘consistent with … obligations under international 
law, including the child’s right to a nationality’.114 They emphasise the important 
role of the courts in ‘amending or correcting civil registration and identity records 
and appealing decisions of civil registration and identity management officials’.115 
There is also a focus on the reduction of statelessness and the minimum legal 
protections required, and on the registration of births to nationals occurring abroad 
(with a brief reference to the Apostille Convention).116 But there is no guidance on 
the legal and procedural framework for recognition of foreign civil status 
documents, or their substitution by the state of residence, nor on the resolution of 
uncertain nationality of the parents or the child on registration of birth (whether 
that takes place at the time of birth or later). The recommended information to be 
registered at birth puts the citizenship of the parents as a low priority item.117 
Even if these interpretations of state obligations are adopted across the 
development sector, the impact of the SDG Target on those of undetermined 
nationality remains uncertain. Central to this uncertainty is the fact that the only 
action specified by the SDG Target is birth registration, and the only indicator 
adopted is the coverage of birth registration among those under five years old, with 
no specification as to the minimum information of the elements of identity to be 
recorded in the register.  
The barriers to birth registration explored above suggest that universal coverage 
of birth registration will not be possible to achieve unless it is delinked not only 
from the parents’ legal status in the country — creating a wall between civil 
registration and immigration enforcement — but also from the common 
requirements to provide documents to prove the nationality of the parent(s) and 
their legal marriage. But such a decision would have costs, not least in relation to 
a reduction in statelessness. If these requirements are removed, so that details 
noted in the birth registry entry could be based on simple declaration by the 
parents, the nationality of the child remains uncertain — unless the birth is in one 
of the minority of states (mostly in the Americas) that provide nationality on a jus 
soli basis without further conditions.  
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Thus, even with universal birth registration, many children could be left with 
undetermined nationality and at risk of statelessness — and would remain so as 
adults without law and procedural reform to resolve their status. Among those who 
be stateless without additional protections in law and practice are: 
 
• Children of unknown parents and place of birth; 
• Children separated from their parents, including trafficked children or 
orphans, who hold no copy of a birth certificate or any other 
documentation; 
• Children who cannot acquire nationality from one of their parents, because 
of gender discrimination in the law (most often, preventing children born 
out of wedlock from acquiring nationality from their father, or born in 
wedlock from their mother); 
• Children whose rights to nationality depend on the legal recognition of the 
parents’ marriage both in the state where the marriage took place and in 
the state of the child’s birth, and these documents cannot be produced or 
are not accepted as valid;  
• Children of stateless parents; 
• Children whose parents’ nationality is unknown or undocumented, or 
whose identity documents are out of date or rejected as fraudulently 
acquired; 
• Children who cannot acquire the nationality of (one of) their parents, 
because of restrictions on transmission of nationality to those born outside 
their state(s) of origin; 
• Children whose births were registered in the country of birth, but the 
registration was not transcribed as required, within the relevant 
timeframes, into the records of the consular or other relevant authorities of 
the state(s) of origin of the parents; 
• Children born through the use of assisted reproductive technologies, 
including international surrogacy arrangements; and 
• Children who cannot acquire a nationality from one of their parents, and 
who can only acquire the nationality of the state of birth on reaching 
majority. 
In all these cases, ensuring that a child has the right to acquire a nationality will 
require legal reform and administrative procedures to implement that right in 
practice. Effective legal protection against statelessness in practice almost always 
involves providing general legal rights to acquire nationality based on birth and/or 
residence in a country, given the difficulties of proving statelessness of the child 
or parent. Efforts to register a child — or adult — with another form of legal status 
(including the status of stateless person), and a document to match, may be helpful 
as an interim measure over the short term. But history shows that sometimes such 
interim measures become permanent, serving to identify as outsiders a group of 
non-citizens who have no meaningful connection to any other country than the one 
in which they were born and live. 
It seems that there are no short cuts to the legal and political processes required 
to determine nationality and end statelessness. If an identity other than that of 
‘resident’ is to be registered, both private and public international law must be 
mobilised to help resolve these uncertainties — ideally at the time of birth, but 
later if that is not done. A name, birth registration, the recognition of family 
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relations and a nationality are rights in international law; states have corresponding 
obligations. 
For private international law, a renewed effort is needed within The Hague 
Conference to develop stronger guidance on the acceptance and/or re-
establishment of civil status documents across borders. Painful as the process 
would be, it is necessary. The draft UN Guidelines on the Legislative Framework 
for Civil Registration, Vital Statistics and Identity Management are also an 
opportunity to provide a more robust legal and procedural framework for the 
resolution of the status of those whose nationality is not clear.118 A final or revised 
version could include a framework for procedures to resolve cases of 
undetermined nationality, including the late registration of the various different 
aspects of a person’s legal identity, and transcription or independent confirmation 
and registration of civil status events that originally took place in another country. 
The World Bank’s Principles on Identification for Sustainable Development are 
also under review.119  
From the perspective of international human rights law, art 8 of the CRC 
provides the most useful entry point. In line with the classic tripartite set of 
obligations, states parties to the CRC should respect, protect, and fulfil the right to 
identity. There is no existing UN document setting out the content of these 
obligations in this particular field. However, the outlines are reasonably clear; I 
propose the following summary. ‘Respect’ implies that the state will recognise 
that the identity belongs to the individual and will not interfere with its enjoyment: 
for example, destroy identity documents or records, or annul or amend them 
against the person’s wishes without a court order, or arbitrarily remove children 
from their families, broadly defined. ‘Protection’ requires the state to ensure that 
records and documents of the key elements of identity (within that state’s legal 
system) are preserved from destruction by others, secured by privacy and data 
protection laws, and re-established if destroyed, and that private sector registration 
efforts are properly regulated. The elements of ‘fulfilment’ would include an 
obligation to enable comprehensive civil registration (including a right to consular 
assistance for nationals outside the country and their children born abroad), and to 
ensure that these registers are easily accessible, including from other countries, 
and remain so as archives; to adopt a national legal framework that prevents and 
reduces statelessness; and to establish protection systems to implement these 
rights. In all cases, basic principles of international human rights law require 
effective and accessible independent oversight, by courts and other mechanisms, 
of decisions about the registration of legal identity, including nationality. All of 
these could be elaborated in greater detail, and prioritised for action according to 
context. 
SDG Target 16.9 is both an opportunity and a threat for stateless persons and 
those at risk of statelessness. The opportunity is the belated emphasis on the 
importance of official recognition and registration as a means for an individual to 
assert rights as a member of society. The threat is the danger that short cuts and 
interim solutions, a utilitarian commitment to the majority or to the priorities of 
the state rather than the individual, mean those of ‘doubtful’ status are — despite 
the SDG commitment — left behind. 
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